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A B S T R A C T
This communication seeks to draw the attention of researchers and practitioners dealing with forensic
DNA proﬁling analyses to the following question: is a scientist’s report, offering support to a hypothesis
according to which a particular individual is the source of DNA detected during the analysis of a stain,
relevant from the point of view of a Court of Justice? This question relates to skeptical views previously
voiced by commentators mainly in the judicial area, but is avoided by a large majority of forensic
scientists. Notwithstanding, the pivotal role of this question has recently been evoked during the
international conference ‘‘The hidden side of DNA proﬁles. Artifacts, errors and uncertain evidence’’ held
in Rome (April 27th to 28th, 2012). Indeed, despite the fact that this conference brought together some of
the world’s leading forensic DNA specialists, it appeared clearly that a huge gap still exists between
questions lawyers are actually interested in, and the answers that scientists deliver to Courts in written
reports or during oral testimony. Participants in the justice system, namely lawyers and jurors on the one
hand and forensic geneticists on the other, unfortunately talk considerably different languages. It thus is
fundamental to address this issue of communication about results of forensic DNA analyses, and open a
dialogue with practicing non-scientists at large who need to make meaningful use of scientiﬁc results to
approach and help solve judicial cases. This paper intends to emphasize the actuality of this topic and
suggest beneﬁcial ways ahead towards a more reasoned use of forensic DNA in criminal proceedings.
 2013 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.
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jou r nal h o mep ag e: w ww .e lsev ier . co m / loc ate / fs igLet us devote a few moments of thought to literature dealing
with forensic DNA evaluation published over the past few years,
papers on forensic DNA presented at international conferences (for
example, the conference ‘‘The hidden side of DNA proﬁles.
Artifacts, errors and uncertain evidence’’ in Rome, Italy, 27th to
28th April 2012), international (corporative) standard DNA
procedures and guidelines, the form of DNA proﬁciency tests by
recognized professional organizations (such as the ISFG), and try to
address the following question: ‘What is the shared point between
these documents, presentations and resources?’ There may be
various replies to this. Here, we wish to focus on one that – in our
view – appears forthright and is one of concern: the resources
reﬂect a partial misreading of the way in which scientists should
assist the judiciary in assessing results of DNA proﬁling analyses.
This misconception arises at a time when scientists operate
analytical techniques that are so powerful that they allow them to
obtain proﬁling results even from tiny stains, or physical matter
that is actually not visible. It thus is currently possible to obtain* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: franco.taroni@unil.ch (F. Taroni).
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.fsigen.2013.03.012DNA proﬁling results for locations where no particular biological
material is directly recognizable. To further complicate matters,
even if there is visible staining, it may be that it is degraded, but
bears invisible material from another source that is in better
condition, and it is this latter material that will give rise to proﬁling
results. When such potent analytical techniques meet highly
variable real world conditions, the obvious suggestion would be
that scientists take greatest care to focus on ensuing interpretative
issues. But what does this exactly mean and to what degree do
scientists comply with this requirement?
Although it is generally desirable and useful that scientists will
assist in assessing whether or not particular DNA proﬁling results
might be related to a visible staining, and it is important that the
inability to do so should have an impact on considerations of
probative value, invoking only an unspeciﬁed possibility of an
event of contamination, to discard scientiﬁc results entirely, is not
serving the purpose of justice adequately. First of all, the absence of
visible staining to which DNA proﬁling results could be related
should lead to a shift in the deﬁnition of the competing
propositions of interest. According to a now generally recognized
conceptualization, propositions can be hierarchically positioned
with regard to, respectively, (i) the source of recovered material,
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recovered material, or (iii) the legally qualiﬁed offense in the case
at hand. This is known as the concept of hierarchy of propositions
[1,2]. This concept plays a critical role in placing the meaning of
DNA proﬁling results appropriately into context. Beyond particular
applications such as kinship analyses, we will emphasize
throughout this note that there is a need to consider so-called
activity level propositions in cases involving results of DNA
proﬁling analyses obtained for transferable traces or stains.
For the sake of transparency and the honest reﬂection of the
inherently unknown state of affairs, a stringent analysis of the
outset suggests that a traditional pair of source-level propositions
of the kind ‘‘the crime stain comes from the suspect’’ versus ‘‘the
crime stain comes from an unknown person’’ would be more
appropriately rephrased in terms of propositions called ‘at sub-
source level’, deﬁned as follows: ‘‘The DNA is that of the suspect’’
versus ‘‘the DNA is that of an unknown person’’. However,
consideration of DNA proﬁling results at sub-source level leads
to paradoxical situations. In fact, while courts are typically
interested in questions such as ‘how did this DNA get here?’
rather than ‘whose DNA is this?’, propositions at sub-source level
precisely address the latter category of questions. In a strict sense,
thus, the scientist’s reporting is not tailored to the request of
mandating authorities. As a consequence of this, current practice
leaves it to the courts to operate a move to higher propositional
levels that will better suit their needs, even though this requires
taking into account issues such as transfer, persistence, search and
recovery performance, as well as contamination. By nature, these
are all highly technical aspects, but also depend heavily on
circumstantial factors. It is questionable, thus, if the courts can be
expected to meet the challenge of moving to higher propositional
levels where the construction of sound arguments demands the
proper understanding of the aforementioned factors, and solid
empirical knowledge. Even most scientists would currently refrain
from evaluations at this level essentially because they feel that
empirical data in these matters is currently too scarce. Actual
forensic practice, yet forensic science in general, thus demon-
strates a considerable gap between the information offered by
scientists and the very needs of the judiciary.
It is also not rare to note that discussions about DNA proﬁling
results coming from mixtures or traces with low quantities of DNA
focus on the degree to which particular signals in raw data
(electropherograms) are indicative of the true donor(s) allelic
constitution(s). Although allele designation is a crucial step in the
use of DNA in criminal proceedings, it is far from the questions of
primary interest to the courts. Surely, the courts are interested in
any information about traits of the individual(s) that are at the
origin of particular physical matter detected in connection with a
crime – so it is crucial that such determinations are made
accurately – but what courts are really interested in is an
assignment of probative value once that DNA proﬁles have been
obtained, in whatever form, single or replicate. But, what is such a
probative value and why do many case-working scientists
currently struggle to address this request adequately? The
fundamental question when evaluating the probative force of
results of forensic examinations is: ‘‘What is the capacity of these
results to distinguish between the competing propositions put
forward at trial?’’ Any discourse on the probative value of scientiﬁc
ﬁndings thus starts with the deﬁnition of the competing
propositions of interest. Accordingly, scientiﬁc results do not have
an intrinsic probative value that scientists who conduct examina-
tions on material and seized items could derive in isolation from
the framework of a case. Instead, the value of ﬁndings can only be
speciﬁed in a given context. This redirects the discussion to the
hierarchy of propositions that, itself, is closely connected to the
circumstances of a case at hand. This hierarchy is not rigid,however, but seeks to offer a ﬂexible template to help position
propositions with respect to the issues that the courts are
concerned with.
The ultimate propositional level is called ‘crime-level’ and can
be exempliﬁed with propositions of the kind ‘‘the suspect is the
offender’’ versus ‘‘an unknown person is the offender’’. Often,
scientiﬁc ﬁndings cannot readily be considered in the light of such
an advanced level of propositions, essentially because this requires
a broad knowledge about circumstantial information that clearly
lies beyond the scope of the expert’s area of competence (notably,
intent to commit the crime). It is for this reason that the hierarchy
of propositions also covers lower levels, such as the activity-level
or source-level. In the context, activity-level propositions are
important because they embrace the possible processes – in
particular, activities of the allegedly involved individuals – that led
to the scientiﬁc ﬁndings in the case at hand. The degree to which
target activities satisfy legal deﬁnitions (e.g., particular crimes),
then remains a duty of the judiciary. While the relevance of this is
not contested, it may thus be questioned why scientists persist in
addressing their ﬁndings given source-level propositions.
This question is all the more discomforting because a given level
of propositions, or an expression of probative value at a given level,
cannot by default be extended to another level of propositions. The
failure to recognize this by either scientists or other members of
the judiciary is also known as a violation of the hierarchy of
propositions. That is, observing a correspondence between
analytical characteristics of a trace and comparison material from
a suspect (source-level) does not necessarily imply support for the
proposition according to which the suspect has actually left the
crime stain at hand (activity-level). Little seems more obvious than
this assertion, most notably when it is made beyond reference to a
given case, but yet experience teaches us all how easily and
recurrently this precept is contravened in legal practice.
Source-level propositions require not much more than infor-
mation about the rarity of the corresponding characteristics,
expressed with reference to population genetic considerations.
Eventually, formulaic expressions of probative value may also be
taken into account, but still the respective propositions remain
formulated at source-level. The obvious advantage of the reduced
collection of factors involved in source-level approaches is that
they can be formulated rather independently of any context. They
typically reduce to a formula that any analyst with at least some
awareness of basic computations will be able to use. But this comes
with a high price: the usefulness of the computed result for the case
at hand may be severely limited, if not completely devoid. This is
not to suggest that formulae for evaluation at source level are
‘simple’ – indeed they can be so highly elaborated that end users
may not even be proﬁcient enough to actually understand their
derivation. This is also not to contest that the comparison of DNA
proﬁles can help to exclude individuals as potential sources or,
otherwise, select candidate individuals for further investigation.
The point is that the formulation of propositions at source-level as
such often segregates a given computational result from the very
issues in a case at hand. Moreover, when considering probative
value in terms of a likelihood ratio, it cannot be used as a
multiplicative device – which is one of the very strengths of this
approach to reasoning under uncertainty – if the propositions
under which the scientist chose to work are different from those
retained by the recipient of expert information.
Substantially more effort is needed for evaluation at activity-
level because it demands evaluators to take into account further
phenomena such as transfer, persistence and background presence
due to, possibly, other and legitimate actions. In a large majority of
criminal cases, this inferential perspective of evaluation with
respect to selected propositions is missing. In fact, discussions
about source attribution are commonly paired with other topics
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derivation that is of aimless from an argumentative point of view.
That is, if the question of interest is that of inferring the source of
DNA, then the rarity of the compared characteristics in a relevant
population is by far the main inﬂuencing factor – leaving aside, for
the time being, considerations of the probability of error that may
outweigh rarity indicators. Issues such as contamination or
transfer are perfectly irrelevant when inquiring about source
alone. Indeed, to formulate it in more general terms, the detected
analytical characteristics are just what they are independently of
how the trace arrived there where it was detected. Issues such as
contamination and transfer become relevant in a case against a
corresponding suspect only when the target propositions are
formulated on the activity-level and stipulate, for example, that
the suspect conducted the incriminated activity (e.g., assaulted the
victim) versus an appropriate alternative. Although it is such
propositions that obviously appear to be considered by courts in
many cases, they do not do so in a proper way when it comes to
presenting or debating the probative value of the DNA proﬁling
results. This is unfortunate because the probative value of DNA
proﬁling results may substantially differ between source- and
activity-level, and suggesting an assessment at source level as one
at activity level by spurious argument about contamination and
transfer places defendants under acute risk of unwarrantedly
incriminating conclusions.
In the area of forensic DNA – and similarly for other transfer
traces, stains or marks – we emphasize that, throughout, a
meaningful and balanced assessment should help to address
issues relating to the alleged activities to which DNA is thought
to be associated, rather than isolated considerations of source of
any recovered material. To further substantiate this point,
suppose a scenario with traces that bear only a small quantity of
DNA, without further details being available on the nature of the
biological material at hand. Would there be a real point of
deliberating about source level propositions? If evaluated at
source level, regardless of the alleged circumstances, the ﬁnding
of a correspondence in analytical characteristics between the
traces and control material from a suspect will virtually always
provide support – and, most often, very strongly so – for the
prosecution’s proposition. Typically, that strength of support
would in some general sense be inversely proportional to the
rarity of the DNA proﬁle. It is important to notice, however, that
such an assessment would only be based on the intrinsic features
(i.e., the genetical proﬁle) of the recovered material. The very
same conclusion would have been reached had a large quantity
been recovered, or whatever other quantity. The same conclu-
sion would also have been reached if the corresponding proﬁle
had been found for material recovered in any position, whatever
its relevance or compatibility with the circumstances of the case
at hand. Stated otherwise, the same value would be assigned in
fundamentally different scenarios that bring in diametrically
opposed extrinsic features that have their say about the alleged
activities. For example, ﬁnding a single low quantity bloodstain,
although ‘matching’, may not be something well in agreement
with a given alleged proposition of aggression (which would
make us expect abundant traces of undried blood), whereas
such a ﬁnding may be well in line with a particular defense
proposition. Conversely, ﬁnding a large amount of biological
material, or several stains with corresponding proﬁles, could be
well accommodated within a scenario of aggression, whereas
such a ﬁnding may not agree well with the defense’s proposi-
tion. A ﬁt-for-purpose evaluation of ﬁndings should thus
concentrate on the alleged activities in order to bring to the
fact-ﬁnder the appropriate strength associated with all the
forensic observations, that is both, intrinsic and extrinsic
features.This call is all the more discomforting as there are even
laboratories that devote substantial instrumental and human
resources to the analysis of single cells while remaining
fundamentally incapable of addressing questions of the following
kind: ‘What is the probative value of a DNA proﬁle of a single cell
found to correspond with the proﬁle of a named individual?’. It is
also discomforting as there still are many forensic and legal
practitioners who would be prepared to accept the categoric but
fallacious conclusion that a reported match in such a case signiﬁes
or implies the establishment of common source, as illustrated, for
example, during panel discussions held at the Rome conference
mentioned above.
But even if one should not agree that the ﬁeld’s persistence
with source-level propositions is detrimental to an operationally
meaningful assessment of DNA proﬁling results, one would still
need to admit that the way in which source-level evaluations are
currently conducted – in particular where they amount to
reported likelihood ratio values in the billions (i.e., based solely
on the rarity of DNA proﬁles) – is plainly shortsighted because the
probability of (laboratory) error is not taken into account. Despite
being described and discussed in both forensic literature and
practice since a long time, the latter factor is still not included in
routine source-level assessments. Since current knowledge and
data does not allow to regard the probability of error to be
anywhere near as small as conditional proﬁle probabilities, the
probability of error tends to completely dominate the value of the
likelihood ratio – possibly rendering the rarity of the correspond-
ing characteristics virtually ineffective. It is thus scientiﬁcally
unacceptable and unsound to ignore the probability of error and,
worse, to continue research that focuses on population studies
rather than on works that help to better circumscribe the
probability of error, yet the phenomenon of error over the whole
DNA process as such, and ways how to assess this particular issue
on a case-based level.
This allows one to conclude that current reporting practices for
forensic DNA at source level are deﬁcient in at least two respects.
Firstly, source-level propositions ignore vital aspects of the
processes and actions that led to the genesis of the analyzed
biological material. It is often argued that the move from source-
level to higher propositional levels such as activity-level should be
entirely conﬁned to the judiciary, but this would disregard the fact
that scientists could offer relevant knowledge and advice on
aspects that the judiciary cannot (or, not exclusively) be expected
to be proﬁcient (e.g., phenomena of transfer, persistence and
recovery). Secondly, the source-level assessments actually offered
by scientists may misrepresent the probative value by many orders
of magnitude if they are restricted to rarity expressions for the
corresponding characteristics (i.e., when no probability of error is
taken into account).
Who is to make the principal effort to make progress towards a
more balanced, meaningful and responsible use of forensic DNA
proﬁling results? Participants in the justice system, namely
attorneys, judges and jurors, can hardly change their questions
of interest: the choice of competing propositions is mainly dictated
by characteristics and circumstances of the case, with activity level
as an often unavoidable minimum hierarchical level. Scientists, in
turn, can be expected to operate in a more ﬂexible environment
despite the fact that their role varies strongly in different court
systems, namely the adversarial system in many English-speaking
countries, as opposed to the inquisitorial systems used in many
countries of Continental Europe. In essence, it is experts who
provide information to lay persons (juries, judges, attorneys for the
parties) on forensic science matters that – most often – these
persons know only little about. The duty of experts should thus
encompass the task of helping the court understand how to frame
inference problems in terms that are scientiﬁcally relevant.
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process.
Although current forensic knowledge may restrict the extent to
which scientists can offer reporting beyond source level, the nature
of forensic science is such that focused research can be conducted,
so as to generate new knowledge that can assist scientists in
progressing towards reporting at higher and more relevant
propositional levels: the community of forensic DNA specialists
have it in their hands to choose this path of research and to deﬁne
the relevant priorities. The effort to launch extensive and
structured research projects in this ﬁeld can only be supportedby funding agencies who have to be made aware of the challenges
and lacks of the current forensic practices. This note argues in
support of a broad agreement and common understanding of this
topic because this is essential for making this endeavor a success.
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